We extend a notion of a lexicographic domination between strategies, introduced for normal form games in Okada (1988), to extensive games via the transformation from the extensive form to the agent normal form. It is shown that lexicographically undominatedness implies subgame perfection of an equilibrium point in extensive games with perfect recall.
Introduction
To investigate a perfect equilibrium point in n-person games in normal form, we introduced in Okada (1988) a notion of a lexicographic domination between strategies of players by incorporating Selten (1975) 's "trembling-hand" approach into the ordinary domination between strategies. It is proved that the following well-known theorem still holds with respect to the lexicographic domination : a perfect equilibrium point is an undominated equilibrium point in n-person games in normal form and, when n = 2, the converse is also true. The lexicographic domination may narrow down the set of undominated equilibrium points in the ordinary sense when n _> 3.
In this paper, we will extend the notion of a lexicographic domination to extensive games by means of the transformation from the extensive form to the agent normal form and will present some properties of it. Our main result is that lexicographically undominatedness implies subgame perfection of an equilibrium point in extensive games with perfect recall.
I am grateful to an anonymous referee for very helpful comments and suggestions. A preliminary draft of this paper was written while I was visiting the MEDS Department of Northwestern University in 1986-87. The warm hospitality of that department is gratefully acknowledged. Akira Okada, Kyoto Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University, Sakyo, Kyoto 606-01, Japan.
0020-7276/91/2/95-108 $2.50 9 1991 Physica-Verlag, Heidelberg
A. Okada
To motivate our discussions, we start with an example of a three-person game Pl in Figure 1 .1. In the game P1, each player i (= 1, 2, 3) has one information set and has two choices L i and R i. The payoffs of all players are given by column vectors at all endpoints of the game according to the natural order of players. It is easy to see that there exist no ordinary domination relations between strategies in F 1 and thus all these equilibrium points are undominated in the ordinary sense. On the other hand, the first two equilibrium points e 1 and e 2 are subgame perfect but the last two equilibrium points e 3 and e 4 are not. This shows that the ordinary domination between strategies is not a very useful tool for us to investigate a perfect equilibrium point of an extensive game. Next let us consider the lexicographic domination between strategies in the game Pl introduced in Okada (1988) . Unlike the ordinary one, we define the lexicographic domination between strategies of every player associated with each equilibrium point in the model of a perturbed game developed by Selten (1975) , i.e., by taking into account slight possibility that all other players may deviate from the equilibrium point. For example, consider the equilibrium point e 3 = (R 1 , R 2, L 3 ). In this equilibrium point, player 1 selects R 1 and the payoff vector (2, -1, -1) is realized. Since player 3's information set is not reached, player 3 is indifferent between L 3 and R 3 at the equilibrium point. However, if the opponents may deviate from the equilibrium point with very small probability, player 3 will have to be concerned
